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First Amendment Limitations on Public
Disclosure Actions
In most states truthful public disclosure of private facts' con-
cerning an individual constitutes a tort if the disclosure would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person and if the disclosed subject
matter is "not of legitimate concern to the public. ' 2 If the disclosed
subject matter is of legitimate public concern, however, the news-
worthiness privilege immunizes the disclosure.3
The newsworthiness defense has been established in the case
law for over thirty-five years,4 and a decade ago the Supreme Court
decided Time, Inc. v. Hill5 with an opinion that has been widely
interpreted as ruling that newsworthiness as a limitation on privacy
suits is mandated by the first amendment's guarantee of freedom
I Private facts are those known, at most, to just a few people. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 809-11 (4th ed. 1971).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D(b) (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, comments b-d at 113-16 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967). The public
disclosure tort was spawned by a seminal law review article, Warren & Brandeis, The Right
To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). For a detailed chronicle of the growth of the privacy
tort, see D. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS (1972).
This comment is concerned with constitutional limitations on actions for public disclo-
sure of private facts. Accordingly, in speaking of "privacy," reference is made only to the
interest protected by the public disclosure tort. However, three other torts are conventionally
classified with the public disclosure tort under the rubric of privacy actions. See W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, § 117, at 804. These torts are: (1) "appropriation, for the defendant's benefit
or advantages, of the plaintiff's name or likeness," id.; (2) "intrusion upon the plaintiff's
physical solitude or seclusion," id. at 807; and (3) "publicity which places the plaintiff in a
false light in the public eye," id. at 812. This comment is also not concerned with the
constitutional right of privacy, which is designed to preserve certain fundamental, personal
rights free from governmental interference. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Comment, The Constitutional Right of Privacy: An
Examination, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 263 (1974). The courts have declined to treat public disclosure
suits as actions to vindicate the federal constitutional right to privacy. See, e.g., Morris v.
Danna, 411 F. Supp. 1300 (D. Minn. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 547 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1977).
But cf. Comment, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462 (1973) (arguing that
the first amendment affirmatively supports a right to privacy).
I The newsworthiness defense was established as an integral part of the privacy tort by
Warren and Brandeis. Drawing an analogy to the qualified privilege of "fair comment" under
the common law rules of defamation, they argued that "the right to privacy does not prohibit
any publication of matter which is of public or general interest." Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 2, at 214.
1 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940). See Comment, The Right Of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive Confusion in the De-
fense of Newsworthiness, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 722 (1963), an interesting discussion of the news-
worthiness privilege at common law.
5 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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of the press.' Despite this august history, the definition, application,
and effect of the newsworthiness privilege remain unsettled. This
unresolved conflict between the important and profound interest
protected by the public disclosure tort, preservation of a reasonable
sense of individual dignity,7 and freedom of the press, a basic free-
dom as well as the guardian of other liberties, has understandably
attracted enormous scholarly attention. Constitutional scrutiny of
the privacy tort in both the legal literature and the courts has con-
centrated almost exclusively on the newsworthiness privilege.' The
inquiry has focused on the exceedingly difficult problem of formu-
lating a standard of newsworthiness that permits the states to pro-
tect legitimate privacy interests in a manner consistent with first
amendment freedoms.
The thesis of this comment is that the defense of newsworthi-
ness does not exhaust the constitutional limitations on the public
I Professor Kalven's seminal piece, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment:
Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 267, interpreted Justice Brennan's opinion in Hill
as establishing that "[n]ewsworthiness defines the ambit of constitutional concern." Id. at
282.
, The interests protected by the public disclosure tort have been defined and redefined
many times. Warren and Brandeis wrote that the principle underlying the right to privacy
was "that of an inviolate personality." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 205. Another
commentator has asserted that the wrong redressed by the public disclosure tort "is to be
found in the fact that a private life has been transformed into a public spectacle." Bloustein,
Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconsti-
tutional as Well? 46 TEx. L. REv. 611, 619 (1968). A recent student comment has suggested
that three specific privacy interests are affected by public disclosures: "(1) an interest in
retaining actual control over the release of information about oneself, for the sake of one's
dignity and individuality; (2) an interest in preserving intact (or not, as one sees fit) one's
relationships with others; and (3) an interest in how the public perceives one, or reputation."
Comment, An Accommodation of Privacy Interests and First Amendment Rights in Public
Disclosure Cases, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1385, 1394 (1976). See also A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM (1967); Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts, 72 COLUM. L. REV.
693 (1972).
This comment defines the interest protected by the public disclosure tort as "a reason-
able sense of individual dignity." This formulation is a heuristic device designed to collec-
tively capture the important interests which are at times safeguarded by the public disclosure
tort.
See, e.g., Beytagh, Privacy and a Free Press: A Contemporary Conflict in Values, 20
N.Y.L.F. 453 (1975); Bloustein, supra note 7; Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy:
The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REv. 41 (1974); Kalven,
Privacy In Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326
(1966); Kalven, supra note 6; Nimmer, The Right To Speak From Times to Time: First
Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968);
Phillips, Defamation, Invasion of Privacy, and the Constitutional Standard of Care, 16 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 77 (1975); Comment, The First Amendment Privilege and Public Disclosure
of Private Facts, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 271 (1976); 5 CAP. U.L. REv. 267 (1976); 14 DuQ. L. REV.
507 (1976); 29 VAND. L. REV. 870 (1976). But see Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 96 Idaho 202, 525
P.2d 984 (1974); Comment, An Accommodation of Privacy Interests and First Amendment
Rights in Public Disclosure Cases, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1385 (1976).
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disclosure tort. The comment first discusses the relevant Supreme
Court and lower court cases and then directly examines the consti-
tutional constraints on the privacy tort. Finally, a model is proposed
for accommodating the tort with the first amendment.
I. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
No Supreme Court decision squarely addresses the question of
the standard of protection afforded by the first amendment for
truthful public disclosure of private facts. Indeed, the Court has
expressly declined to decide whether the public disclosure tort is in
principle compatible with the first amendment A few cases, how-
ever, do provide clues to the Court's thinking on the manner in
which freedom of the press circumscribes the public disclosure ac-
tion.
A. Hill and the Public Interest Test
In Time, Inc. v. Hill' the Supreme Court reviewed the judg-
ment Hill" had obtained under the New York privacy statute,' 2
which provided an action only if the privacy-invading story was
"fictitous."'' 3 The Court ruled that "the constitutional protections
for speech and press preclude the application of the New York stat-
ute to redress false reports on matters of public interest in the ab-
sence of proof that the defendant published the report with knowl-
edge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of its truth."'4 Because the
I Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
" In 1952, James Hill and his family were held hostages in their own home by escaped
convicts for nineteen hours, then released unharmed. The Hills' captors were peaceable and
courteous. The incident was widely reported at the time but subsequently the Hills moved
far away, and Mr. Hill discouraged further publicity of the affair. In 1955, Life magazine ran
a story concerning a play based on a novel about a hostage incident involving considerable
violence. The story indicated that the play accurately portrayed the Hill incident. The Life
story did not damage the Hills' reputation; they were portrayed as courageous in the face of
peril. 385 U.S. at 377-78.
" N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948).
, 385 U.S. at 384 n.9.
" Id. at 387-88. Although this scienter requirement was enunciated in the majority
opinion authored by Mr. Justice Brennan, only Justices Stewart and White joined the opinion
without qualification. Justices Black and Douglas joined in the opinion only in order to settle
the case on the basis of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This acquies-
cence was coupled with the stated belief that the New York Times doctrine was "bound to
pass away as its applications to new cases proves its inadequacy to protect freedom of the
press from destruction in libel cases and other cases like this one." 385 U.S. at 398 (Black &
Douglas, JJ., concurring). Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the reversal because the New York
statute as interpreted by the state courts would permit imposition of liability upon a showing
of substantial falsity. Had the New York courts construed the statute to require negligent
[45:180
Public Disclosure Actions
jury had not been instructed that knowledge or reckless disregard
of falsity was requisite to a finding of liability, Hill's judgment was
reversed and the case remanded."5
The Court's argument in support of its decision was brief:
The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of
political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential
as those are to healthy government. One need only pick up any
newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of pub-
lished matter which exposes persons to public view, both pri-
vate citizens and public officials. Exposure of the self to others
in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized com-
munity. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life
in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech
and of press . . . .We have no doubt that the subject of the
Life article, the opening of a new play linked to an actual
incident, is a matter of public interest."6
The Court in Hill was careful to distinguish the case before it
from both public disclosure1 7 and defamation actions.' But the
Court's cautious refusal to say anything about public disclosure
actions has not dissuaded commentators from reading Hill as estab-
lishing newsworthiness as a complete, constitutionally mandated
defense to a public disclosure suit. 9 Since Hill, lower courts have
similarly accorded the newsworthiness defense constitutional stat-
ure.
20
falsification, Harlan would have found that the constitutional requirements were met. 385
U.S. at 402-03 (Harlan, J., concurring).
,1 The knowing or reckless falsehood standard, also known as the actual malice standard,
was first announced by the Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
That landmark case held that a public official could not maintain a libel action for a defama-
tory falsehood related to his official conduct absent proof that the defamatory statement was
made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of its falsity. See Kalven,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,"
1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191. The recklessness disjunct of the actual malice standard has been
interpreted to require subjective awareness of probable falsity. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
11 385 U.S. at 388.
11 Id. at 383 n.7. The Court quoted Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., where it was stated:
"Revelation may be so intimate and so unwarranted as to outrage the community's notion of
decency." 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940). The court noted that
Hill "presents no question whether truthful publication of such matter could be constitution-
ally proscribed." 385 U.S. at 383 n.7.
385 U.S. at 389-90.
' See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1279 (9th ed.
1975); Kalven, supra note 6, at 280-81.
See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998
(1976); Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 96 Idaho 202, 525 P.2d 984 (1974); McNutt v. New Mexico
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Much of the opinion in Hill supports the inference that the
Court implicitly accepted the principle that truthful disclosure of
"matters of public interest" cannot constitutionally give rise to lia-
bility for invasion of privacy. In one key passage the Court declared
that the risk of some public revelations of private facts must be run
"in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and
press,'2 indicating that the first amendment delimits in some un-
specified way the permissible range of the public disclosure tort.
Furthermore, the ground of the Court's ruling that tort liability may
not be predicated upon an inaccurate story absent proof of actual
malice was not that false speech has any independent first amend-
ment value but rather that tolerance of any less restrictive state-of-
mind requirement would discourage true speech about matters of
public concern. 2
Although there is certainly unqualified language in Hill which
supports the view that the newsworthiness defense to the public
disclosure tort has been constitutionalized, the unusual situation
presented by the case counsels caution before acquiescing in that
conclusion. The New York court had interpreted the statute that
Hill brought suit under as providing a cause of action upon a show-
ing that a report concerning the plaintiff was substantially false,2
and Hill had not been required to show that the falsified disclosures
seriously infringed his privacy interests.24 The combination of that
circumstance with the Court's refusal to intimate any views about
the public disclosure tort suggests that lower courts and commenta-
tors have found more guidance in Hill than is warranted.
State Tribune Co., 88 N.M. 162, 538 P.2d 804 (1975). But see Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
4 Cal. 3d 529, 541, 483 P.2d 34, 42, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 874 (1971) (adopting a limited reading
of Hill); cf. Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 261, 249 N.E.2d 610, 617 (1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970) (distinguishing Hill as a case where the public interest in the
dissemination of news was more significant than the privacy interests at stake).
Z1 385 U.S. at 388.
11 Id. at 388-89.
23 See Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 328-29, 221 N.E.2d 543, 545, 274
N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (1966).
Although the sole requirement for liability under the New York statute was that the
report be substantially false, most commentators refer to Hill as a "false light" action. See,
e.g., Nimmer, supra note 8, at 958. False light actions are predicated upon the defendant's
placing the plaintiff in a false light before the public eye in a manner highly offensive to a
reasonable person in the plaintiff's position. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E
(Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). The unorthodox nature of the suit in Hill helps explain the Court's
statement in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1974), that it had
no occasion to inquire whether the Hill standard applied to all false light cases.
2, Professor Kalven noted that, in their preoccupation "with the role of 'falsity' in erasing
the newsworthiness privilege, [the New York courts] have not looked to see if there was a
prima facie invasion of privacy in the first place that required the protection of a privilege to
avoid liability." Kalven, supra note 6, at 281 n.36.
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B. The Gertz Retrenchment
Recent developments in the area of libel law might further
undercut the view that, when faced with the question, the Court will
hold that publication of newsworthy stories-stories that deal with
matters of public interest-may never serve as the basis for privacy
liability. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.2 5 the Court disapproved the
position a plurality of the Court had taken in Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, Inc.2" that "all discussion and communication involving
matters of public or general concern" warrant the protection from
liability afforded by the knowing or reckless falsehood standard.17 In
part, the position of the Rosenbloom plurality was disapproved be-
cause the Court did not wish to require "state and federal judges to
decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of
'general or public interest' and which do not-to determine, in the
words of Mr. Justice Marshall, 'what information is relevant to self-
government.' "28 Instead of adopting a public interest test to trigger
the actual malice requirement, the Court held that "so long as they
do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individ-
ual. ' 29 The knowing or reckless falsehood standard, the Court
stated, is required only where the defamed individual is a public
figure.°
The Court did not spell out why judges are unfit to apply the
"matter of public interest" test. It may be that the justices felt that
the determination of whether a story addresses matters of public
concern is such an intractable inquiry that adoption of the test
would result in uncertainty in libel law, an uncertainty that would
intolerably inhibit freedom of the press. Alternati- ely, judicial ad-
ministration of the public interest test may have been thought to
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
26 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined Justice Bren-
nan's opinion which announced the decision of the Court. Id. at 30. Justices Black and White
concurred only in the judgment. Id. at 57.
Id. at 44.
21 418 U.S. at 346. On its face, this criticism is directed only at a newsworthiness defense
defined in terms of the relevance of the disclosed subject matter to self-government. See
Bloustein, supra note 7, at 61, 90; see generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960).
Justice Marshall's objection would apply, however, to any formulation of the newsworthiness
defense which requires judges or juries to assess the utility and public importance of the
particular privacy-invading speech.
" 418 U.S. at 343.
30Id.
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violate the principle that restrictions on speech be content-neutral.'
One commentator has even suggested that the Court's reluctance to
require judges to evaluate the public interest in speech was partly
founded upon a realization of the undemocratic nature of judicial
review.2 Whatever the rationale, the rejection of the public interest
test as not meet for judicial judgment was not linked to any particu-
lar feature of defamation.
The implications for the public disclosure tort of the Gertz
Court's rejection of the public interest test in defamation cases are
somewhat difficult to discern. The consequences of declining to
adopt a public interest test in the two contexts differ greatly. The
function of the public interest test in Rosenbloom was to define the
circumstances in which the knowing or reckless falsehood standard
must be applied. Since Gertz, the public figure test has been used
instead of the "matter of public interest" test to determine whether
knowing or reckless falsehood, rather than some lesser degree of
fault, must be shown. In a defamation case, deciding whether the
plaintiff is or is not a public figure, and thereby deciding whether
the actual malice or fault test applies, does not conclude the case
in either party's favor. 3
In contrast, the function of the public interest test in privacy
cases is to determine whether the speech at issue is of high first
amendment value. The speech involved in defamation cases, since
false, has no constitutional value.34 True speech that is of legitimate
concern to the public, on the other hand, is important to the citizens
qua governors, helps preserve the balance between stability and
change, and often serves as a means of self-fulfillment '.3 If speech
is of high first amendment value, it is generally immune from regu-
3' See text and notes at notes 117-119 infra.
32 Note, 9 GA. L. REv. 963, 970 n.24 (1975).
The applicability of the Gertz public figure/private figure distinction in the privacy
context is uncertain. Gertz offered two reasons for distinguishing among defamation plain-
tiffs. First, public officials and public figures are less vulnerable to lasting reputational injury
because they have greater access to "the channels of effective communication and hence have
a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally
enjoy." 418 U.S. at 344. Second, the news media are "entitled to act on the assumption that
public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of
injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them." Id. at 345. Although the second rationale
for the distinction can be extended to the privacy context-it is no more of a conclusory fiction
to say that public figures have consented to invasions of privacy than to say they have
consented to reputational injury-the first rationale cannot. More publicity will only exacer-
bate the invasion of privacy, not correct it. See Nimmer, supra note 8, at 961.
31 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
3 For a discussion of the values promoted by the first amendment, see T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
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lation or prohibition." Under modern first amendment doctrine it
is unlikely that the gravity of the evil caused bya public disclosure,
individual dignitary injury, is ever great enough to justify restrict-
ing newsworthy speech. Thus, failure to recognize a public interest
test in public disclosure actions would render the tort unconstitu-
tional. Faced with such a result, the Court might overcome its un-
easiness regarding the public interest test.37
C. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn
The only public disclosure suit to reach the Supreme Court
suggests that some form of newsworthiness limitation upon public
disclosure actions is constitutionally required. In Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn31 the Court ruled that the Supreme Court of Georgia
erred in holding that Cohn, the father of a deceased rape victim,
could constitutionally maintain a privacy action against defendants
who had identified the victim by name during television coverage
of the trial of the alleged rapists.3 The Court held that the first
amendment proscribes the imposition of sanctions for the accurate
publication of a rape victim's name obtained from judicial records
open to public inspection.
Identifying the rule of law established in Cohn proves some-
what difficult. On the one hand, the Court reasoned that there
could, under the circumstances, be no actionable invasion of privacy
because "the commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it,
and judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions, are without
question events of legitimate concern to the public and conse-
quently fall within the responsibility of the press to report the opera-
tions of government."40 At this juncture, the Court seemed to be
1' See, e.g., Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
345 U.S. 444 (1969). The least protective test applied to high-value speech in recent years
was the discounted clear and present danger standard employed in Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976). See generally Symposium: Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REv. 383-626 (1977). In that case the Court apparently applied the test
only because there was no need to determine if the restraint would be invalid under a more
protective test. It is unlikely that a discounted clear and present danger test will be given
general applicability.
' In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455 (1976), the Court, faced with the argument
that the matter of legitimate concern to the public language in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), signaled a return to Hill and Rosenbloom, declared that the Cohn
test should be restricted to suits involving truthful reports and should not be invoked in the
libel area because defamation involves false and inaccurate statements.
- 420 U.S. 469 (1975), noted in 5 CAP. U.L. REV. 267 (1976); 14 DUQ. L. REV. 507 (1976);
24 EMORY L.J. 1205 (1975); 9 GA. L. REV. 963 (1975).
" Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 200 S.E.2d 127 (1973), rev'd, 420 U.S.
469 (1975).
1* 420 U.S. at 492 (emphasis added).
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operating within the conceptual framework of the Hill case, declar-
ing speech protected because it concerns events or matters of public
interest. Accordingly, the Court found no need to evaluate the social
utility of broadcasting the name of a rape victim. It would be incau-
tious, however, to conclude that the Court has completely overcome
the misgivings voiced in Gertz concerning the "matter of legitimate
interest" test. The Court did not discuss the Gertz retrenchment at
all, and it did set forth two additional rationales for decision which
are not dependent upon case-by-case judicial determination of what
disclosures address matters of public concern.
First, the Court declared that "[p]ublic records by their very
nature are of interest to those concerned with the administration of
government, and a public benefit is performed by the reporting of
the true contents of the record by the media."'" Fleshing out this
position, the Court noted that public records contain vital informa-
tion about governmental operations, that the citizenry is entitled to
know about the operations of government, and that even the most
concerned citizens would lack important information without fear-
less press coverage of the public record.4 2 Furthermore, Justice
White, writing for the Court, suggested that Georgia "[bly placing
the information in the public domain on official court records...
must be presumed to have concluded that the public interest was
thereby being served."43
At first glance, this ground for decision seems unsupportable.
The generalization that information on the public record is of legiti-
mate public concern appears to admit of numerous exceptions, a
paradigmatic example being a rape victim's name. The Court did
not attempt to demonstrate any connection between publicizing the
name of a rape victim and self-government, fair trials, or any other
public concern. On the contrary, the public has a positive interest
in preventing the publication of the name of a rape victim-to avoid
deterring future rape victims from reporting rapes to the police.4
Likewise, the Court's reliance on Georgia's assessment of the public
interest in speech is hard to understand because the Court is cer-
tainly not prepared to defer questions concerning the scope of first
amendment freedoms to state legislatures for resolution.
The Court, however, was undoubtedly aware that the profferred
4' Id. at 495.
42 Id. at 491-92.
' Id. at 495.
Policy arguments for and against affording constitutional protection to the publication
of a rape victim's name are collected in D. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESs 202 (1972).
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generalization was flawed. The key to understanding this ground of
the decision is contained in the following passage:
We are reluctant to embark on a course that would make public
records generally available to the media but forbid their publi-
cation if offensive to the sensibility of the supposed reasonable
man. Such a rule would make it very difficult for the press to
inform their readers about the public business and yet stay
within the law. The rule would invite timidity and self-
censorship and very likely lead to the suppression of many
items that would otherwise be put into print and that should
be made available to the public."
Due to its reservations, expressed in Gertz, about the ability of
judges to evaluate the public utility of speech, yet unwilling to
unnecessarily admit that the public disclosure tort cannot coexist
with the first amendment, the Court seized on the generalization
that public records are often the repository of information possess-
ing high first amendment value and ruled that the generalization
should not brook exception. Moreover, the Court declared, "We are
reluctant to embark on a course that would make public records
generally available to the media but forbid their publication if of-
fensive to the sensibilities of the supposed reasonable man ...
The rule would invite timidity and self-censorship."46 The Court in
Cohn remained committed to "a strategy that requires that speech
be overprotected in order to assure that it is not underprotected"; 47
it was not persuaded that there exist sufficiently certain and admin-
istrable standards for permitting some public disclosure actions to
succeed without inhibiting the press from publishing admittedly
important material.
Buttressing the result dictated by its first two grounds of deci-
sion, the Court argued that, as recognized by the common law pub-
lic records defense to a privacy action, there is no substantial pri-
vacy interest in information already on the public record.18 Although
the Court was less than explicit, the argument seems to be that
because no legitimate privacy interests are infringed by giving pub-
licity to public information, it is unconstitutional to impose sanc-
tions on the press for printing such information, regardless of its
importance."
4 420 U.S. at 496.
Id.
" Kalven, supra note 15, at 213.
" 420 U.S. at 493-96.
" The Court relied on the following passage from the commentary to the Restatement
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This argument rests on a false premise. Although it is true that
a public disclosure action lies only if the facts disclosed are not
widely known, it is disingenuous to suggest that all facts on the
public record are public facts, in the sense that they are known to a
substantial number of people. Giving publicity to little-known facts
in the public record may appreciably affect individual privacy."
The Cohn case has been discussed as if the Court treated the
three grounds of decision as independently sufficient. However, it
should be emphasized that the Court took care to restrict its holding
to cases involving official records of judicial proceedings.5' It is im-
possible to predict whether Cohn will be extended to protect all
disclosures of matters of legitimate public concern or even to protect
all disclosures of information contained in the public record.
To summarize the imbroglio of Supreme Court decisions that
provide any indication as to the manner in which the first amend-
ment restricts the scope of the public disclosure tort, the Court has
committed itself only to the narrow holding of Cohn and has left
most of the area uncharted. In particular, the Court has criticized
yet at times invoked the "matter of legitimate concern to the pub-
lic" test, adopted a bifurcated test turning on the nature of the
plaintiff in the related area of libel, and assessed the injury to pri-
vacy interests where the information disclosed was obtained from
judicial records open to the public. It has declined either to embrace
any principles for general resolution of the first amendment issues
involved in public disclosure actions or to rule the tort unconstitu-
tional.
II. LOWER COURT CASES
Lacking specific guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower
courts have treated the constitutional limitations on public disclo-
sure actions disparately. 52 Five strikingly different approaches are
of Torts: "[Tihere is no liability for giving publicity to information about the plaintiff which
is already public. Thus there is no liability for giving publicity to facts about the plaintiffs
life which are matters of public record." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, comment
c at 114 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967), quoted in 420 U.S. at 494.
11 Few citizens bother to investigate the general public record, and empirical studies have
found that public access to information in the public record is often severely restricted by
bureaucratic inertia. See, e.g., Research Study-Public Access to Information, 68 Nw. U.L.
REv. 177 (1973).
11 420 U.S. at 491, 496.
52 As long as the reach of the public disclosure tort was viewed solely as a matter of
common law, the administration of public disclosure actions properly varied from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. The newsworthiness privilege turned on the demonstrable public interest,
Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956), the plaintiff's status as a
public figure vel non, Harms v. Miami Daily News, 127 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961), the
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discernible in the recent case law." The cases generally accord con-
stitutional status to the newsworthiness defense, and struggle to
define its contours. These lower court efforts will be explained, cate-
gorized according to their most unusual feature, and evaluated in
terms of their capacity to meet the challenge implicitly put by the
Supreme Court in Cohn: the development of administrable stand-
ards for the trial of public disclosure suits that permit some deserv-
ing plaintiffs to recover and at the same time afford solid, certain
protection to first amendment liberties.
A. Demonstrable Public Interest
Due perhaps to understandable trepidation at defining the le-
gitimate public interest, some courts have defined newsworthiness
by reference to the popular interest in the particular private facts
disclosed.54 The difficulties with this approach are illustrated by the
nature and purpose of the publication, Sellers v. Henry, 329 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1959), and the
offensiveness of the publication, Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 239 P.2d 630 (1952).
Moreover, there was no agreement on the division of function between judge and jury in
determining whether a publication was privileged. Compare Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo.
1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942), and Sellers v. Henry, 329 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1959), with Wheeler
v. P. Sorensen Mfg. Co., 415 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1967), and Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C.
333, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
The propriety of variety disappears with the recognition that the first amendment delim-
its the permissible scope of the tort. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1945). This
proposition may be thought refuted by the Court's decision in Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973). In Miller the Court held that the factual determination of obscenity is to be made
by application of contemporary community standards, not national standards. This conclu-
sion did not, for the Court in Miller, entail rejection, only qualification, of the principle that
first amendment guarantees are constant nationwide.
Under a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limitations on the pow-
ers of the States do not vary from community to community, but this does not mean
that there are, or should or can be, fixed, uniform national standards of precisely what
appeals to the "prurient interest" or is "patently offensive." These are essentially ques-
tions of fact, and our Nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably
expect that such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation,
even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists.
Id. at 30. See also Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
5 What may be termed the enigmatic approach to the constitutional defense of newswor-
thiness has found favor with some courts. That is to say, judges often declare that a particular
article, photograph, or broadcast is or is not newsworthy without offering any supporting
analysis or explanation. See, e.g., Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 654
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 326 So. 2d 471, 474 (Miss. 1976);
Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting Div., Meredith Corp., 472 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Kan. Ct. App. 1971).
See also Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 960 (1970), criticized in Comment, The "Titticut Follies" Case: Limiting the Public
Interest Privilege, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 359 (1970).
11 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958); Sidis v. F-R
Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940); Hazlitt v. Fawcett
Publications, 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953); McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co.,
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case of McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co.55 Five police offi-
cers and their wives brought a privacy action when their names and
addresses were published in a newspaper report of a gun battle
between the officers and two members of a group known as the
"Black Berets," both of whom were killed. Prior to publication of
the story, the city editor" of the defendant newspaper had called the
plaintiff policemen seeking information about the shoot-out. Fol-
lowing instructions from their superiors, the policemen declined to
discuss the incident; the editor threatened to print the plaintiffs'
names and addresses because of their refusal to cooperate. The
names were published and after publication the officers received
anonymous phone calls threatening violence.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment. The Court of Appeals of New Mexico affirmed, ruling
that the names and addresses of the plaintiffs were newsworthy as
a matter of law. After recognizing that newsworthiness is a constitu-
tionally required defense to a public disclosure action,57 the court in
McNutt defined newsworthy private facts as those "relatively cur-
rent events such as in common experience are likely to be of public
interest."58 In applying this test, however, the New Mexico court did
not draw on its experience to speculate on the range of popular
interest in the plaintiffs' names and addresses. 9 Instead, the names
and addresses were newsworthy because "[i]t is the usual practice
in newspaper accounts to identify persons by giving their names and
addresses .... "60
McNutt illustrates that when newsworthiness is defined in
terms of the demonstrable public interest in the particular facts
disclosed, courts will not ordinarily review a publisher's decision
that a particular story is newsworthy." Publishers generally print
only what they believe to be of interest to their readers, and judges
88 N.M. 162, 538 P.2d 804 (1975). Except for McNutt, decisions employing a popular interest
standard were decided before the newsworthiness defense was constitutionalized. See text
and notes at notes 21-24 supra. The popular interest standard has been expressly rejected by
some courts. See, e.g., Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publishing Co., 218 Kan. 295, 304-05, 543 P.2d
988, 996 (1975).
- 88 N.M. 162, 538 P.2d 804 (1975).
The city editor was named as an individual defendant.
88 N.M. at 166-67, 538 P.2d at 808-09.
Id. at 167, 538 P.2d at 809 (quoting Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451
(3d Cir. 1958)).
11 The plaintiffs conceded that the gun battle was newsworthy. 88 N.M. at 167, 538 P.2d
at 809.
Id. at 167, 538 P.2d at 809.
*1 See Comment, The Right of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive Confusion in the Defense
of Newsworthiness, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 722, 725-26 (1963).
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are wisely hesitant to second-guess the publisher's business judg-
ment. Moreover, there are no standards by which judges can quanti-
tatively assess the popular interest in a particular news item. 2 Even
an uninteresting article published in a popular journal may be
widely read. The test of newsworthiness advanced in McNutt thus
protects editorial discretion. 3 This result, however, is gained at the
cost of eviscerating the privacy tort with respect to mass media
defendants.
More importantly, the demonstrable public interest test fails to
pass constitutional muster when applied to non-media defendants.64
An individual who is not professionally engaged in mass-media re-
porting cannot claim to be an unerring judge of the public interest.
Although judges presumably could assess evidence as to the size of
a speaker's audience or the readership of a hand-distributed pam-
phlet, findings on these matters have little, if any, relevance to
deciding whether the speech involved is constitutionally impor-
tant. 5 Consider, for example, an individual who discloses private
facts about a public official that directly bear on the official's fitness
for office. This speech is constitutionally protected even if the
speaker's audience is so insouciant or disaffected with politics that
the speech is paid no attention. In a word, the standard of news-
worthiness espoused in McNutt is both over- and under-inclusive.
B. Defendant's Motives
It might be thought that the constitutional privilege to give
publicity to private facts should not extend to individuals who dis-
62 Cf. Kalven, supra note 8, at 336 ("[Slurely there is force to the simple contention
that whatever is in the news media is by definition newsworthy, that the press must in the
nature of things be the final arbiter of newsworthiness.").
," The constitutional mandate to preserve editorial discretion was emphasized in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See also Cantrell v. Forest City
Publishing Co., 484 F.2d 150, 156-57 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 419 U.S. 245
(1974) ("The judgment of what is newsworthy must remain primarily a function of the
publisher . . . .Only in cases of flagrant breach of privacy which has not been waived or
obvious exploitation of public curiosity where no legitimate public interest exists should a
court substitute its judgment for that of the publisher.").
" This is not to suggest that freedom of press is guaranteed to individuals. See Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254 (1974); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,
412 U.S. 94, 113 (1973). Rather, it is submitted that defining the constitutional protection
for the public disclosure of private facts in terms of the popular interest in the publicized
facts unconstitutionally abridges freedom of speech. See generally Nimmer, Introduction-Is
Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech? 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 639 (1975).
,1 Such evidence would be relevant to determining whether the facts had been publi-
cized, however. See text and note at note 1 supra.
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close private facts out of objectionable motives. 6 In Taylor v.
K. T. V.B., Inc.,67 the Supreme Court of Idaho may have adopted this
view. An Idaho television station broadcast a film clip showing Tay-
lor being arrested and taken from his home in the nude. Taylor
brought a privacy action against the station and recovered a judg-
ment in the trial court. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho
reversed. The court recognized that speech concerning matters on
which the public is entitled to be informed, such as the conduct of
police officers and those they arrest, 8 is presumptively protected,
but ruled that this protection is forfeited if the "disclosure was made
with 'malice,' i.e. for the purpose of embarrassing or humiliating
[the subject of the disclosure], or with reckless disregard as to
whether that disclosure will result in such embarrassment or humil-
iation."6 Because the jury had not been instructed that a finding
of "malice" was a prerequisite to recovery, the court held that the
defendant television station was entitled to a new trial.70
The Taylor opinion may be read in two ways. On the one hand,
the Idaho court quoted a number of authorities for the proposition
that reports of arrests, including identifications of arrestees, are
newsworthy. 7' In stating its holding, however, the court declared:
"Use of material of a highly offensive nature for the purpose of
embarrassment of an arrestee, or with reckless disregard for the
embarrassing aspects of it is not necessary to keep the public in-
formed." 72
If the court meant that although the arrest was of legitimate
public concern, the film of Taylor's private parts was not, the deci-
sion is commendable. Adding to newsworthiness a standard of care
requirement sensibly increases the protection given to speech. If,
" In 1974 the Supreme Court held that truth was a constitutionally required uncondi-
tional defense to a defamation action. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). At
one time, however, a number of states required that the defendant in a defamation suit show
good motives or justifiable ends in addition to truth. See Franklin, The Origins and Constitu-
tionality of Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REv. 789, 790 (1964).
" 96 Idaho 202, 525 P.2d 984 (1974).
Id. at 204-06, 525 P.2d at 986-88.
" Id. at 205-06, 525 P.2d at 987-88.
" The Idaho court purported to follow Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974),
and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in establishing the malice require-
ment. 96 Idaho at 206, 525 P.2d at 988. This reliance is inappropriate because the actual
malice standard in defamation cases protects negligent and innocent falsehoods only because
a contrary rule would inhibit truthful speech concerning matters of public importance. See
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340; New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 278-80. The court in Taylor stood
the malice requirement on its head, employing it to withdraw constitutional protection from
truthful speech.
7' 96 Idaho at 204-05, 525 P.2d at 986-87.
72 Id. at 206, 525 P.2d at 988.
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however, the court meant to rule that disclosures made with
"malice" are never worthy of constitutional protection, then the
doctrine of the Taylor case is disturbing indeed.
Under the latter interpretation of Taylor, whether a disclosure
is constitutionally protected turns solely on the speaker's state of
mind. First, if the defendant is shown to have been subjectively
aware that the publication or broadcast in question would embar-
rass or humiliate the plaintiff, the defendant's newsworthiness de-
fense is defeated. The constitutional defects of such a rule are ob-
vious. For example, the disclosure of official corruption might well
embarrass the politicans involved, yet such a disclosure is of un-
deniable constitutional significance.73 The standard of care require-
ment does not render the test constitutionally permissible; unless
the disclosure is deceptively inoffensive, freedom of the press is
guaranteed only to insentient publishers.
Second; the disclosure is unprotected if the defendant's purpose
was to embarrass or humiliate the plaintiff. This branch of the
Taylor malice test is superficially more attractive; it may appear
that a constitutionally important distinction can be drawn between
stories designed to inform and stories designed to embarrass an
individual. The first amendment has not been thought a bar to
recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.74 More-
over, the standard is administrable-triers of fact often determine
an individual's motives.' Upon examination, however, the rule is
inconsistent with the first amendment. The first amendment pre-
serves the public's right to be informed on matters of public import-
ance.7 1 The Taylor test, in contrast, focuses on the blameworthiness
of the speaker. As a consequence, people will refrain from giving
publicity to private facts of legitimate public interest. Those who
73 See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).
11 See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 12. The criticism of Taylor advanced herein,
however, implies that if the act complained of in a suit for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress consists of the accurate publicizing of newsworthy private facts, the first
amendment precludes the action. See text and notes at 76-77 infra.
" For example, in an action for malicious prosecution, the jury determines whether the
defendant instituted the proceeding maliciously. W. PRossER, supra note 1, § 119.
11 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM (1960); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1965). This is not to suggest that the only purpose of the
first amendment is to guarantee the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern. Self-expression is an end in itself, a part of self-fulfillment. Moreover, free speech
may be cathartic for those who might otherwise express themselves violently. The first
amendment serves these purposes. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring).
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would speak out of malice will be silenced by the threat of tort
liability. Because it cannot be assumed that a disinterested individ-
ual will always have the access to private facts of public importance
enjoyed by an interested adversary, silencing the malicious speaker
may deny the public newsworthy information. Moreover, a person-
ally disinterested individual with access to private facts of legiti-
mate public interest will be inhibited from making them public by
the possibility that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of
hatred.77 In its concern to do justice between the parties to a privacy
suit, the Taylor rule thwarts the public rights guaranteed by the
first amendment.
C. Consent
It is an established principle of tort law that consent of the
victim may immunize acts that would otherwise amount to actiona-
ble torts." Accordingly, consent has long been a recognized defense
to a mass disclosure suit.79 However, some recent privacy decisions"
have confounded the common law defense of consent with the con-
stitutional defense of newsworthiness and have employed a notion
of consent to determine whether a publication was constitutionally
protected in cases where the express or implied consent necessary
to waive a tort action was lacking.
These decisions are of two types, those openly admitting the
element of consent and those speaking of "public figures," and are
exemplified by Neff v. Time, Inc."3 and Rawlins v. Hutchison Pub-
lishing Co., 82 respectively. In Neff a federal district court held that
the publication of a photograph of a football fan with the zipper of
his trousers open was constitutionally privileged because the fan
was one of a group that had encouraged and posed for the photogra-
pher. 3 In Rawlins the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that a former
17 The Supreme Court emphasized similar factors in striking down a criminal defamation
statute that punished false statements if made with ill-will. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 73 (1964).
T See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 18, at 101-08.
7' Id. § 117, at 817.
See, e.g., Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Briscoe v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971) (consent treated as one factor
to be considered in deciding if a privacy-invading publication was constitutionally protected);
Rawlins v. Hutchison Publishing Co., 218 Kan. 295, 543 P.2d 988, 993 (1975). But see
Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting Division, Meredith Corp., 472 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Kan. App. 1971)
(first amendment privilege applied even though the individual publicized was involved in a
newsworthy event against his will).
' 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
2 218 Kan. 295, 543 P.2d 988 (1975).
13 406 F. Supp. at 859-62.
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police officer could not, consistently with the first amendment,
maintain a public disclosure suit based on a newspaper account of
his official misconduct because he, as a public figure, had "waived"
his right to privacy with respect to facts bearing on his fitness for
office."4
The danger fostered by the idioms of consent and public figure
is that courts will rely on slogans and catchwords instead of analyz-
ing the privacy and first amendment interests at stake in a particu-
lar case. Neff and Rawlins illustrate this problem. Although it is
difficult to quarrel with the result in either case-no private facts
were disclosed in Neffl5 and the story objected to in Rawlins dis-
closed facts of legitimate public concern-both opinions avoid pre-
cise identification of the reasons a public disclosure action is or is
not constitutionally permissible under the circumstances. As gener-
alizations such statements as "public figures enjoy only a very lim-
ited right of privacy" may be true, but their invocation impedes
rather than promotes the proper resolution of individual cases. At-
tention must be paid to the considerations underlying the generali-
zations in order to determine whether a particular plaintiff may
maintain a public disclosure action.
There are at least two reasons why a public figure is generally
less likely to successfully prosecute a privacy suit than is a private
individual. Knowledge of why the generalization obtains leads to
appreciation of the need to dispense with it. First, the actions of
public figures are likely to be of legitimate interest. For example, a
report disclosing that the United States ambassador to the United
Nations used foul language in a private meeting with the Ugandan
ambassador should not give the United States ambassador a right
of action for invasion of privacy because the fact disclosed is of
legitimate public concern. Moreover, disclosure of even the most
private facts about a public official, such as a serious drinking prob-
lem, may promote informed exercise of the franchise. Second, pub-
lic figures may find it difficult to establish that their privacy has
been invaded. To recover in a privacy action, the plaintiff must
prove that the disclosure of private facts about which he complains
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person in his position.
Movie stars often expect, indeed trade on, public interest in their
personal lives. Whether a particular plaintiffs privacy has been
unreasonably violated turns upon a determination of the plaintiff's
" 218 Kan. at 300-01, 543 P.2d at 993-96.
The court in Neff recognized that the fact disclosed in the photograph had been made
public already by the plaintiff. 406 F. Supp. at 861 (alternative holding).
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position and the degree of privacy one in that position could reason-
ably expect to preserve.
It should be evident that the reasons a public figure can be said
to "enjoy only a limited right to privacy" do not obtain across the
board. The task of developing administrable standards to accommo-
date privacy interests with first amendment rights cannot be ac-
complished simply by inquiring whether the plaintiff is a public
figure. The first amendment does not command that those who
advertently enter into public life surrender their rights to any
degree of privacy. Conversely, important and newsworthy private
facts may concern an otherwise obscure individual. Defining
"public figure" so as to single out those persons about whom partic-
ular private facts become, by choice or accident, of legitimate public
concern merely rephrases the problem of determining what private
facts are newsworthy.86 There is no substitute for the identification
and evaluation of the privacy and first amendment interests at issue
in each public disclosure case.
D. The California Approach
The California courts have developed a unique approach to
resolving the first amendment issues in public disclosure actions. In
Melvin v. Reid 7 a California appellate court declared that even
though the biography of a rehabilitated prostitute once accused of
murder was newsworthy, the prostitute's name was not. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court subsequently adopted this distinction be-
tween events, which are almost always of public interest, and identi-
fication of individuals, which may not be. In Kapellas v. Kofman8
the court ruled that an editorial describing a political candidate's
family problems was protected, while in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest
Association 9 the court held that the public interest in identification
of a rehabilitated truck hijacker may be outweighed by the state's
and the individual's interest in rehabilitation and privacy."
"' In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455 (1976), the Court indicated that the
determination of who is a public figure for the purpose of invoking the actual malice standard
is not divorced from an ascertainment of the legitimate interests of the public. See also
Comment, An Accommodation of Privacy Interests and First Amendment Rights in Public
Disclosure Cases, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1385, 1415 (1976) (suggesting that adoption of the public
figure/private figure distinction in the privacy context in lieu of the public interest test would
have no practical significance). But see Phillips, supra note 11, at 80-85.
'7 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969).
4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971), noted in 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1042
(1972); 5 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 544 (1972).
11 4 Cal. 3d at 537, 483 P.2d at 40, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 872. Surprisingly, the district court
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The California cases have been criticized by some commenta-
tors as inviting judicial "censorship."9 The doctrine does in fact
appear to require intrusive judicial scrutiny of a kind likely to cause
uncertainty in editorial offices. The formula for decision involves
consideration of "[1] the social value of the facts published; [2]
the depth of the article's intrusion into ostensibly private affairs;
and [3] the extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a
position of public notoriety. '9 2 No threshold of dignitary injury is
required; apparently the court must in each case strike a balance
unstructured by straightforward and administrable doctrines. The
flexibility and comprehensiveness of the social utility test is
achieved at the expense of predictability and ease of administration.
The California courts' focus on whether disclosure of the plain-
tiff's identity is of public interest, however, promotes principled
adjudication of public disclosure suits. Assessing the public interest
in identifying particular individuals is more tractable than deter-
mining what subjects or what private facts are of legitimate public
concern. 3 Individual privacy is not seriously injured by privacy-
invading stories which do not identify individuals; by focusing on
the very aspect of the publication that triggers the claim of invasion,
the California courts have made an important contribution.
E. Offensiveness
Virgil v. Time, Inc.94 arose out of a Sports Illustrated article on
body surfing at an especially dangerous California beach known as
the "Wedge. 9 5 The plaintiff, Mike Virgil, was reputed to be the
most daredevil body surfer at the Wedge. Virgil granted interviews
to the writer of the magazine story, but objected to the story's publi-
on remand granted summary judgment for the defendant. H. NELSON & D. TEETER, LAW OF
MASS COMMUNICATIONS 199 (2d ed. 1973).
1, Pember & Teeter, Privacy and the Press since Time, Inc. v. Hill, 50 WASH. L. REv.
57, 81 (1974).
,2 Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 36, 459 P.2d 912, 922, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 370 (1969).
11 See text and notes at notes 133-151 infra.
14 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976), noted in 29 VAND. L.
REv. 870 (1976).
,1 The article, entitled The Closest Thing to Being Born, appeared in the Feb. 22, 1971
issue of Sports Illustrated.
"Because Virgil himself revealed the allegedly private facts to the reporter, the defendant
contended that Virgil had made the facts public or, alternatively, that Virgil had consented
to the magazine's disclosing the private facts. Id. at 1126-27. The Ninth Circuit rejected the
former contention, reasoning that disclosure to a single person, even a reporter, is not a
disclosure to the public at large. Id. As to the alternative argument, the court ruled that
consent may be revoked prior to publication unless, perhaps, as was not the case in Virgil,
"an eleventh-hour change of mind. . . would unfairly burden the publisher." Id. at 1127 n.6.
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cation upon learning that it contained "a series of anecdotes about
him which emphasize the psychological characteristics which pre-
sumably explain the reckless disregard for his own safety which his
surfing demonstrates."97 When efforts to halt publication of the
story failed, Virgil brought suit for invasion of privacy.
On appeal from the district court's denial of Time's motion for
summary judgment,99 the Ninth Circuit directly examined the na-
ture of the limits imposed by the first amendment on the public
disclosure action. The court of appeals began its constitutional anal-
ysis of the privacy tort by stating that the purpose of the first
amendment is to protect the public's "right to know," and that the
public's right to know is defined by the newsworthiness defense.' °
In delineating the ambit of the defense the court turned to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. According to the Restatement, a
publication is newsworthy, and hence constitutionally protected, if
it concerns a matter of "legitimate concern to the public."'01 The
court quoted the following passage from the Restatement com-
mentary, observing that it "expresses the distinction between that
which is of legitimate public interest and that which is not"'' 2 as
well as the court could:
In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest,
account must be taken of the customs and conventions of the
community; and in the last analysis what is proper becomes a
matter of community mores. The line is .to be drawn when the
publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the
public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational
prying into private lives for its own sake with which a reasona-
ble member of the public, with decent standards, would say
that he had no concern. 0 3
In a footnote to this passage the court declared: "We do not intend
,1 Id. at 1124. These anecdotes related, among other things, how Virgil had extinguished
a lighted cigarette in his mouth, had eaten insects, and had dived down a flight of stairs for
no apparent reason beyond impressing "chicks." Id. at 1124-25 n.1.
11 The suit was brought in a California state court. It was removed to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California on grounds of diversity by the defendant.
Id. at 1123.
11 It was a certified interlocutory appeal, taken under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). 527
F.2d at 1123.
"1 527 F.2d at 1128. See also Bloustein, supra note 8, at 56-59; Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 255.
101 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
'"1 527 F.2d at 1129 (footnote omitted).
,03 Id. at 1129 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs § 652F, comment f at 130 (Tent.
Draft No. 17, 1967)).
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that 'morbid and sensational' be taken too literally. This is not, in
our view, to be regarded as a statement of a prerequisite, but rather
as illustrative of the degree of offensiveness which should be pres-
ent.,,,104
Having adopted this standard for newsworthiness, the court
proceeded to determine whether the district court's denial of sum-
mary judgment was proper. It ruled that the "privilege" of newswor-
thiness, because dependent on community mores, was a question for
the jury, and that the propriety of summary judgment depended on
whether "reasonable minds could differ" on the issue."°5 Summary
judgment for the defendant would therefore be proper only if "the
answer on which reasonable minds agree favors invocation of the
privilege."' ' The court vacated the district court's order denying
summary judgment and remanded for consideration of whether jury
questions regarding the "state of community mores" were presented
by the facts of the case. 10
On one plausible reading of its opinion, the Ninth Circuit in
Virgil adopted what Professor Hill has called the "unconscion-
ability" standard.0 Under this test, the disclosure must be of a
"shocking character" before liability attaches.00 This rule of liabil-
ity is itself subject to two variant interpretations, each of which
finds some support in different language in the Virgil opinion.
First, the offensiveness or unconscionability standard may be
applied so that whenever a disclosure of private facts shocks a de-
cent member of the community, it is constitutionally unprotected.
By declaring that the newsworthiness defense is the sole constitu-
tional privilege and defining newsworthiness in terms of offensive-
ness,"0 the court may have adopted this variant of the unconsciona-
bility test. This rule of law is insufficiently protective of first amend-
ment freedoms. Disclosure of information which shocks reasonable
,oI d. at 1129 n.11.
'15 Id. at 1131.
'10 d.
WI Id. In particular, the Ninth Circuit stressed that the district court should, in ruling
on the defendant's motion, have the benefit of its recent decision in Guam Federation of
Teachers Local 1581 v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974). 527
F.2d at 1130-31. See generally Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HAv. L. REv.
518 (1970); Comment, Privacy and Summary Judgment: New Tests, New Beneficiaries, 6
SarON HALL L. Rav. 454 (1975).
W" Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205,
1262 & n.271 (1976).
W Id. at 1258.
0 527 F.2d at 1128-29 & n.11.
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people is at times important speech. The test is unacceptable both
because it allows the imposition of sanctions on speech of para-
mount constitutional importance and because a judge or jury deter-
mination of extreme offensiveness is quite unpredictable.
There is, however, a second interpretation of the offensiveness
test employed in Virgil which finds support in the Restatement
commentary quoted. The commentary states that a disclosure is
unprotected only when "it ceases to be the giving of information to
which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational
prying into private lives for its own sake.""' In this passage the court
appears to have adopted a test which, contrary to its earlier state-
ment that newsworthiness defines the extent of constitutional pro-
tection, requires that a disclosure be both offensive and unnewswor-
thy in order to lack constitutional protection. On this view the com-
munity's sense of decency operates as a criterion of legitimacy in
addition to and independently of the criterion of political or social
importance. This is a speech-protective test which, properly clari-
fied, administered, and supplemented, can adequately accommo-
date the right to privacy with the first amendment.12 The court in
Virgil, however, did not work out in any principled way the con-
structs of the test. 13
m-. FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON THE PRIVACY TORT
The failure of the privacy cases decided in the ten years since
Time, Inc. v. Hill"' to develop workable standards for reconciling
legitimate privacy interests with the first amendment is traceable
in part to the assumption that newsworthiness is the exclusive first
amendment limitation on the public disclosure tort."' The newswor-
thiness privilege is indeed one limitation on the permissible scope
'" Id. at 1129.
112 See text and notes at notes 120-151 infra.
3 On remand, the district court somewhat surprisingly granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment. Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
"' 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
"' One virtue of admitting additional constitutional defenses is to relieve the pressure
to define the single constitutional limitation on privacy actions presently recognized, news-
worthiness, in terms which require a judge or jury to indiscriminately consider the extent to
which privacy interests are damaged, see, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483
P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971), and the publisher's need for certainty, see, e.g., Cantrell v.
Forest City Publishing Co., 484 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 419 U.S.
245 (1974), as well as the public's legitimate interest in the facts disclosed. As the examina-
tion of the lower court case law undertaken above demonstrates, commingling these judg-
ments in a single verbal formula without specifying the circumstances under which each is
to be controlling leads to unprincipled and often unconstitutional decisions.
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of the privacy tort. The public disclosure of private facts that are
of legitimate public concern can never serve as the basis for tort
liability. Speech on matters of public interest is of high first amend-
ment value and absolutely immune from prohibition."'
For this reason, public disclosures of private facts of legitimate
public concern must be distinguished from disclosures of private
facts of no legitimate public concern in order to secure any area for
the public disclosure tort to operate. This distinction might be
thought to run afoul of the principle that "above all else, the First
Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its
content.""' However, the rationale for the rule that restrictions on
speech be content-neutral does not fully apply to the distinction
between speech that addresses matters of public concern and speech
that does not. As Mr. Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality of the
Court in Young v. American Mini Theatres,"8 stated:
The essence [of the rule against content distinctions] is the
need for absolute neutrality by the Government; its regulation
of communication may not be affected by sympathy or hostility
for the point of view being expressed by the communicator.
Thus, although the content of a story must be examined to
decide whether it involves a public figure or a public issue, the
Court's application of the relevant rule may not depend on its
favorable or unfavorable appraisal of that figure or that issue."9
"' See text and notes at notes 34-37 supra.
"' Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (ordinance held violative of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because it impermissibly distin-
guished between labor picketing and other peaceful picketing). See also Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1975) (ordinance making it a punishable offense for a
drive-in movie to exhibit films containing nudity when the screen is visible from a public
place held violative of the first amendment because it discriminated among protected speech
solely on the basis of content).
'" 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Five Justices did not assent to the plurality's holding that nonob-
scene, sexually explicit speech is entitled to less than full first amendment protection. How-
ever, the Court has assented to the proposition quoted in the text-that the level of first
amendment protection accorded speech turns on content. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2699 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
"1 427 U.S. at 67-68 (1976). A second rationale for the ban on content distinctions was
once offered by the Court: "Any restriction on expressive activity because of its content would
completely undercut the 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.'" Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964)). This rationale is not only consistent with the distinction between speech regarding
matters of public importance and speech concerning private matters, it incorporates the
distinction.
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Newsworthiness, however, cannot define the entire "ambit of
constitutional concern" 2 ' in privacy cases. Defining the first
amendment limitations solely in terms of newsworthiness ignores
the constitutional problems inherent in the imposition of sanctions
on true speech that neither injures nor threatens to injure any signif-
icant interest that the government might seek to protect.
True nonnewsworthy speech is entitled to a measure of first
amendment protection. The Supreme Court has declared that the
categories of speech that the first amendment in nowise protects
include speech that is "no essential part of any expression of
ideas" 2' and "of slight social value as a step to truth."'2 On this test
all true statements of fact enjoy first amendment protection.2 3 The
Court has long abandoned the view, if it was ever accepted, that the
first amendment protects only speech which contributes to the pol-
itical process.2 4 Permitting innocuous speech that does not address
matters of public importance furthers the value of individual self-
expression.125 More importantly, as Professor Hill has pointed out,
Supreme Court obscenity cases properly suggest that the first
amendment is concerned with protecting speakers from government
control regardless of the worth of their expression:
[The cases] indicate, in their development, an increasing
sense that the value embodied in the freedom of speech clause
is not merely the cultivation of uninhibited expression with a
view to the potential contribution of such expression to the
common good, but more fundamentally the protection of the
speaker from governmental restraint-a sense that the speaker
has a right to be let alone in the absence of compelling reasons
to the contrary.2 1
"2 Kalven, supra note 6, at 283.
121 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
2 Id. See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (commercial speech is protected).
' Similarly, the court has declared that "there is no constitutional value in false state-
ments of fact," Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974), and perhaps the
negative inference that there is some constitutional value in all true statements of fact can
properly be drawn.
I" See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech'protected); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967) (actual malice standard in libel suits extended from public officials and candidates
to public figures).
12 It has long been recognized that one of the values served by the first amendment is
individual self-expression. E.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
I" Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1205,
1208 & n.9 (1976). Professor Hill quotes the following famous passage from Stanley v. Georgia,
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The degree of protection afforded by the first amendment to
privacy-invading speech that does not concern matters of legitimate
public interest has not been established by the Supreme Court.
However, the appropriate standard for determining the circumstan-
ces under which the first amendment value of such speech is out-
weighed by significant,127 competing interests is already in opera-
tion, although not as a constitutional standard. It is the widely
accepted but often misinterpreted requirement for maintenance of
a public disclosure action that the disclosure be highly offensive to
a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position. 12s The function of the
offensive disclosure requirement, properly understood, is to describe
the class of facts which an individual reasonably and understanda-
bly could want to keep private. Individual privacy is a widely and
deeply held value. The requirement thus operates to pick out those
disclosures which the state has a significant interest in sanctioning.
In sum, the newsworthiness defense and the offensive disclosure
requirement circumscribe the privacy tort, the newsworthiness de-
394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969): "If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what
films he may watch." As Professor Hill recognizes, later decisions have indicated that the
privacy of the home was the touchstone of the Stanley opinion. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973); United States v. Twelve 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 126
(1973). However, the tripartite test of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), itself
indicates that speech which lacks serious social value is protected unless it appeals to the
prurient interest and depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way. Generalizing, unim-
portant speech is protected unless seriously harmful.
I Some decisions regarding restrictions on expression related to issues of public import-
ance provide imperfect analogies to the middle-level protection accorded by the significant
interest test. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-21 (1972) (reasonable
"time, place and manner" restrictions permissible if necessary to further significant govern-
ment interests); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (when a course of conduct
includes speech and nonspeech elements, "a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the non-speech elements can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms."). See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (dictum) (commercial speech protected, yet a different
degree of protection is necessary to protect commercial speech than, for example, political
commentary); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (plurality of the Court
holds that sexually explicit but nonobscene speech may be subjected to more rigorous time,
place, and manner restrictions than other speech).
" In the privacy context, "offensiveness" is a chameleonlike word used in at least four
different senses: 1) to characterize those private facts disclosure of which constitutes a public
disclosure tort, see W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 117, at 811; 2) to describe the manner or
context in which private facts are disclosed, see O'Hilderbrandt v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 40 Cal. App. 3d 323,333-34, 114 Cal. Rptr. 828,833 (1974); Comment, The Right
of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive Confusion in the Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 U. CHI.
L. REv. 722, 725-26 n.17 (1963); 3) to characterize the reasonable public reaction which must
exist before a disclosure is actionable, see Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); and 4) in this comment, to characterize when the plaintiff's
privacy interests are seriously aggrieved.
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fense because it distinguishes speech that cannot be regulated or
prohibited at all from that which can, and the offensiveness require-
ment because it identifies those cases in which privacy interests
outweigh first amendment interests. The remaining question is how
these constitutional limitations should be spelled out and effec-
tuated. Recognizing that in this area of the law, more so than in
most, it is easier to be critical than correct, the remainder of this
comment is devoted to working out the full complex of constraints
which should be placed on privacy suits.
IV. ACCOMMODATING THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE TORT WITH THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: A PROPOSED MODEL
A. The Offensive Disclosure Requirement
The requirement for maintenance of a public disclosure action
that the disclosure be highly offensive to a reasonable person in the
plaintiff's position does not mean, as one influential commentator
has written, "that the matter made public must be one which would
be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sen-
sibilities."'29 The function of the offensive disclosure requirement is
not to define those facts that the public or the individual whom the
facts concern would reasonably find offensive. Such a standard
would ill serve the interests protected by the privacy tort and
scarcely qualify as a candidate for defining the scope of constitu-
tional protection accorded privacy-invading publications that are
not of public interest. Instead, the offensive disclosure requirement
describes those facts an individual reasonably wishes to keep pri-
vate. For example, publication of the intimate details of an individ-
ual's marital life should be actionable, not because the facts dis-
closed are in any way offensive, but rather because the privacy of
such facts is essential to preservation of a reasonable sense of indi-
vidual dignity. The distinction is between offensive facts and facts
the disclosure of which is offensive.
A rule that would withdraw constitutional protection from un-
newsworthy speech because the facts disclosed turned out to be
offensive to the "reasonable plaintiff," however, would transgress
the principle that a publisher "cannot be required to guess.""'3 Sup-
plementing the offensive disclosure requirement as a prerequisite to
liability, the first amendment requires that it be shown that the
' W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 117, at 811.




defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known, that the disclosure would be highly offensive to a reasonable
man in the plaintiff's position.
The duty of reasonable care should be narrowly construed. It
should not import a duty to inquire about the plaintiff's circumstan-
ces. Absent actual knowledge that the disclosure is offensive, the
reasonable care standard should preclude liability if the disclosure
complained of is not, on its surface, destructive of reasonable pri-
vacy interests. A standard that would require the press to undertake
additional inquiries or research would inadequately respect its need
for quick decisions. 3' Requiring a publisher to read what he prints
and to make a reasonable judgment whether a story seriously harms
privacy interests, however, would not impose an undue burden;
under this standard, a publisher need not be correct, merely sensi-
ble. Similarly, when a reporter or writer has a story about an indi-
vidual that he reasonably believes is not destructive of significant
privacy interests, he should be able to write it without having to
inquire further into the subject's circumstances. To illustrate, sup-
pose a publisher runs a story written by an independent contractor 3 2
disclosing private facts concerning an individual, believing on the
" A standard of care defense is also required by the constitutional principle that an
individual must be given notice as to when his speech can serve as a predicate for criminal
or civil liability, lest the exercise of free speech rights be inhibited. See Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 120-24 (1974) (to sustain a conviction for mailing obscene brochures in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970), the first amendment requires that the prosecution show
that the defendant had knowledge of the character and nature of the material distributed).
See also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151-55 (1959).
Professor Kalven once wondered whether a standard of care has a role to play in public
disclosure cases. Kalven, supra note 8, at 334-35. Bloustein responded that the only conceiva-
ble situation in which reasonable care could constitute a defense to a public disclosure action
is when "a publisher utters an account of another's personal life intending and attempting
not to identify the person involved, but, in fact, the publication is identifiable as concerning
him." Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort
Petty and Unconstitutional as Well? 46 Tax. L. Rav. 611, 617 (1968). He added, "The settled
rule concerning motive in intentional torts and in defamation actions is that, as long as the
act constituting the wrong was intended, it is no defense that the consequence of the act was
not. Why should anyone suppose the rule would vary in right to privacy cases?" Id. The view
espoused in this comment is that Kalven's question is more suggestive than Bloustein sup-
posed: privacy-invading publications can be deceptively innocuous, but the first amendment
mandates that notice be given to publishers before restrictions are placed on their right to
print accurate stories.
3I The author's knowledge may be attributed vicariously to his publisher if and only if
the author would be classified as an employee under traditional agency principles. See Can-
trell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1974); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1974); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977). For one
view on the appropriateness of the respondeat superior doctrine in defamation suits, see
Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
54 TEx. L. REv. 199, 246-47, 266-68 (1976).
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basis of the facts known to him that the story does not identify the
individual. Liability should not attach in this situation even if read-
ers more familiar with the plaintiff's circumstances make the
connection, provided that the story does not, on its face, identify the
plaintiff.
B. Newsworthiness
Determining whether speech concerns a matter of legitimate
public interest is extraordinarily difficult. The architect of the pub-
lic speech/private speech distinction, Professor Meiklejohn, argued
that the absolute guarantee of the first amendment is "assured only
to speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with which
voters have to deal."' 33 Dr. Meiklejohn's standard of relevance is
quite expansive, however, for in his view speech concerning educa-
tion, philosophy, literature, science, and the arts is of "governing
importance" because a sensitive and aware electorate requires
knowledge of these subjects. 34
The influence of Professor Meiklejohn's views on the Supreme
Court has been spotty.'35 In the privacy context the Court has ruled
that privacy-invading speech that deals with "matters of public
interest"'36 or "events of legitimate concern to the public"'3 7 cannot
constitutionally serve as the predicate for public disclosure liability,
but without firmly tying the legitimate interest test to the governing
responsibilities of the people.
The Court's only effort to state the standard by which the pub-
lic interest in private facts is to be assessed was in Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 31 where, quoting from Thornhill v. Alabama,'39 it stated:
"Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this
nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed
or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period."'4 °
The obvious difficulty with the Thornhill formula, as with other
" See A. MEIKLEJoHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 94 (1948).
Speech which is not relevant to self-government is, in Meiklejohn's view, protected only by
due process guarantees. Id. at 39.
"u Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 262.
,s See generally Bloustein, supra note 8; Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meikle-
john Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1965).
"' Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
13 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975).
js 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
's 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
385 U.S. at 388.
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attempts to draw a line between public and private speech,' is its
vagueness.4 2 Supreme Court decisions inform us that a rape vic-
tim's name4 3 and the travail of a family once held kidnapped in
their own home"' are newsworthy. But the Court has not explained
how knowledge of such facts prepares any member of society for the
exigencies of our day. A plausible explanation of the determinations
of newsworthiness made in Hill and Cohn, strongly supported by the
language of the opinions, is that the Court, convinced that discus-
sion of crime is important speech deserving constitutional protec-
tion, did not bother with evaluating the public importance of the
particular private facts disclosed. Yet it should be recognized that
there are public aspects to every subject."4 If a single public aspect
renders an entire subject newsworthy, then the public disclosure
tort is unconstitutional.
However, a reasonable alternative to this conclusion exists. By
focusing on the potential area of conflict between the public disclo-
sure tort and freedom of press and speech, first amendment inter-
ests can be preserved without completely sacrificing privacy inter-
' A number of proposals for distinguishing public speech from private speech surfaced
in the wake of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See, e.g., Note, Free
Speech and Defamation of Public Persons: The Expanding Doctrine of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 419, 425 (1967) ("public decisionability"); Comment, The
Limits of Political Speech: New York Times v. Sullivan Revisited, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 631,
648 (1967) (matter of legitimate public concern); Note, The Scope of First Amendment
Protection for Good-Faith Defamatory Error, 75 Yale L.J. 642, 652 (1966) (issue of legitimate
public concern).
Judge Skelly Wright has suggested that the category of matters of public interest encom-
passes "those subjects in which the community as a whole has an interest." Wright,
Defamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right to Know: A National Problem and a New
Approach, 46 Txx. L. REv. 630, 636 (1968).
"1 The Supreme Court has stated in a number of criminal cases that a rule of law "which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process." Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926),
quoted in Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249 (1968) (dictum). Moreover, the Court has
indicated that stricter standards of permissible vagueness may be applied if erratic applica-
tion of the particular rule of law would inhibit exercise of first amendment freedoms: "a man
may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may
be the loser." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1959) (dictum); Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 515-18 (1948). See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
" Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
IJ Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
", But cf. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREsSION 557 (1970). Professor
Emerson, thinking attempts to draw "fine distinctions as to whether the communication has
great or small social value" futile, id. at 556, and at odds with "the whole idea of the First
Amendment," id. at 554, proposes that all privacy-invading communications which invade
the "inner core of intimacy" be actionable while all other disclosures be protected, id. at 557.
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ests. A right of action for invasion of privacy does not arise because
"events" or "matters" have been disclosed. Rather, the privacy tort
is concerned solely with private facts whose disclosure harms a rea-
sonable sense of individual dignity. Indeed, inquiring whether the
private facts disclosed are of first amendment importance is also
unnecessarily wide-ranging. Association of private facts with partic-
ular individuals will often neither increase public sensitivity nor in
any way prepare people for dealing with their own responsibilities
and problems. Moreover, individual privacy is not seriously harmed
by stories which disclose private facts but do not associate those
facts with particular people. "' Accordingly, if the legitimate public
interest in an event or fact is as well served by a story that does not
identify individuals as one that does, both first amendment and
privacy interests may be preserved by publication of the former, and
not the latter, story.
Furthermore, determining if there exists a legitimate public
interest in knowing that certain private facts pertain to a given
individual is a less unwieldy task than deciding what private facts
are newsworthy. For example, the horror of rape may be pointedly
conveyed by a detailed account of a rape omitting the name of the
victim. The simplification consists in circumventing the determina-
tion of whether the public has a legitimate interest in knowing the
details of a particular rape. Only the public interest in the fact
which directly conflicts with privacy interests, individual identity,
need be assessed. Of course, identifying individuals in privacy-
invading stories may serve legitimate public interests. A clear case
is a report revealing that a political candidate has a drinking prob-
lem, because personal identification is directly pertinent to in-
formed exercise of the vote. 4 7
46 Identification of individuals is not confined to printing names or publishing photo-
graphs. Identification may also occur when information in any way links the private facts
disclosed with a particular individual so as to inform an appreciable number of people (who
may or may not know the individual in question) that the private facts refer to the particular
individual.
Bloustein has recognized the crucial role of personal identification in applying the news-
worthiness defense, although in his view newsworthiness, defined narrowly in terms of rele-
vance to self-government, should be the only constitutional defense to privacy actions. See
Bloustein, supra note 8, at 65-69; cf. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3427 (Jan. 9, 1978) (court holds identification of plaintiff to be indis-
pensable to maintenance of defamation and false light identification).
"I Whether identification of the plaintiff is newsworthy under the test outlined in this
comment will not depend on the plaintiff's status as a public figure vel non. Reporting that
the relatively unknown local church leader was arrested for drunken driving should be pro-
tected as an illustration of human hypocrisy. Publishing a photograph of Mrs. Onassis
sunbathing without benefit of a bathing suit should not be protected because the public has
no legitimate concern with the private facts disclosed.
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It might be urged that the proposed method of assessing news-
worthiness would in practice unjustifiably inhibit press free-
dom-that stories will seldom identify individuals because publish-
ers and writers will wish to avoid constantly having to ascertain
what information is of legitimate public concern. This objection is
unpersuasive. Most stories do not reveal private facts. Most stories
revealing private facts and associating them with individuals do not
occasion the serious injury to individual dignity which the offensive
disclosure standard requires. Instances in which the press must
make newsworthiness judgments would be rare and, due to the ac-
tual knowledge/standard of care requirement, apparent.148
It might be thought desirable for the courts to adopt an actual
knowledge/standard of care requirement under which a publisher
making a reasonable but mistaken judgment that a privacy-
invading story is newsworthy would be protected from liability.
Moreover, consistency with the treatment of the offensive disclosure
requirement proposed above might appear to argue for an actual
knowledge/standard of care requirement with respect to newswor-
thiness."I
However, the analogy to the actual knowledge/standard of care
requirement advocated with respect to the offensive disclosure re-
quirement is not convincing. The function of the actual knowl-
edge/standard of care requirement with respect to offensiveness is
to ensure that the defendant is immune from liability when his
mistake in judgment is due to a lack of knowledge of the plaintiff's
situation. The actual knowledge/standard of care requirement with
respect to offensiveness also ensures that the defendant is cognizant
of the facts whose newsworthiness must be determined. If the defen-
dant reasonably but erroneously believes that the publication does
not identify individuals, he would not be charged with knowledge
of the facts that render the disclosure offensive and thus would not
be required to determine whether the identification is newsworthy.
Therefore, newsworthiness need not be supplemented by an actual
knowledge/standard of care requirement. Nor should the defen-
dant's claim that he reasonably but erroneously believed his disclo-
sure was newsworthy be credited. Newsworthiness is a purely legal
concept based on assessment of the first amendment value of the
speech involved. If a publisher schooled in privacy law can make a
"I Moreover, establishment of specific precedents determining when particular private
facts are newsworthy will further alleviate the potential vagueness problems caused by the
lack of precision in the definition of newsworthiness.
"' See text and notes at notes 130-132 supra.
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reasonable but mistaken judgment as to the newsworthiness of an
item, then the doctrine fails to afford adequate notice, and the
public disclosure tort is unconstitutionally vague. 150 If the pub-
lisher's mistaken judgment is due to a lack of legal erudition, then
his reasonableness ought to be no defense. As the Supreme Court
stated in Hamling v. United States, 151 an obscenity case:
It is constitutionally sufficient that the prosecution show that
a defendant [charged with knowingly using the mails to carry
obscene brochures] had knowledge of the contents of the mate-
rial distributed, and that he knew the character and nature of
the materials. To require proof of a defendant's knowledge of
the legal status of the materials would permit the defendant to
avoid prosecution by simply claiming that he had not brushed
up on the law.
C. The Allocation of Judgmental Responsibility between Judge
and Jury
The constitutional standards articulated above for accommo-
dating the public disclosure tort with the first amendment are not
self-executing guardians of first amendment freedoms. However,
the offensive disclosure requirement, the actual knowledge/
standard of care requirement and the newsworthiness privilege are
sufficiently certain and definite to apprise publishers of when pub-
lication of privacy-invading stories can constitutionally give rise to
tort liability, provided that trial judges and reviewing courts are
entrusted with certain important functions in administering these
constitutional standards.
The Supreme Court has not discussed the appropriate division
of judgmental responsibility between trial judge, jury, and appellate
court in adjudicating first amendment defenses to public disclosure
suits. There is considerable disagreement among the lower courts on
whether the question of newsworthiness, the only constitutional
privilege presently accepted, is for the judge or jury to resolve.5 2
However, a number of Supreme Court opinions, 5 ' primarily in the
"I See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151-55 (1959).
Is' 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974).
112 See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1130 & n.13 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 998 (1976) (newsworthiness a jury issue); Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D.
Pa. 1976) (newsworthiness to be resolved by the judge); Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 96 Idaho
202, 206, 525 P.2d 984, 988 (1974) (malice a jury question); McNutt v. New Mexico State
Tribune Co., 88 N.M. 162, 169, 538 P.2d 804, 811 (1975) (newsworthiness a question for the
court).
10 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.. 323, 349-51 (1975); Jenkins v. Georgia,
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libel and obscenity areas, indicate that procedural safeguards play
an indispensable role in protecting first amendment freedoms, and
consistency argues that the principles of "first amendment due pro-
cess" 154 established by the Court should be applied in the privacy
area.
One principle of importance to constitutional administration of
privacy suits has emerged from the Court's quest for "sensitive
tools 155 for appraising first amendment claims: trial judges' and
reviewing courts 57 must independently'58 evaluate the character of
speech to determine what, if any, measure of constitutional protec-
tion its enjoys. 5  The rationales proffered for this rule include the
plausible though unproven assertions that juries are more apt to use
their discretion selectively to punish unpopular views or speakers, 60
that under a system of general verdicts juries are unlikely to care-
fully consider each discrete first amendment issue, 6' that judges are
418 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 291 (1971); Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152 (1967);
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88 n.15 (1966); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58
(1965); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1964); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-
21 (1958).
-' This phrase served as the title of an interesting law review article, Monaghan, First
Amendment "Due Process, " 83 HRv. L. Rv. 518 (1970).
' Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
' In the defamation area, the Supreme Court has ruled that "as is the case with ques-
tions of privilege generally, it is for the trial judge in the first instance to determine whether
the proofs show [the plaintiff] to be a 'public official"'. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88
(1966). Similarly, the trial judge is to make an independent assessment of the facts in an
obscenity case to determine whether the material is obscene or constitutionally protected.
Clicque v. United States, 514 F.2d 923, 925-26 (5th Cir. 1975).
'1 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (obscenity vel non resolved de
novo); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (opinion of Harlan, J.)
(plaintiff's status as a public figure determined); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-90
(1964) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (obscenity vel non resolved de novo); Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) (whether speech presented a clear and present danger determined
independently of state court's finding).
"s The trial judge should resolve the question of the extent of constitutional protection
afforded the speech before submitting the case to the jury and if the speech is found abso-
lutely protected, the jury is precluded from acting. See cases cited in note 156 supra; Mon-
aghan, supra note 154, at 531. Similarly, the appellate court need accord no deference to the
determinations of the trial judge or jury regarding the attributes of the speech itself. See cases
cited note 157 supra.
"I Compare the Supreme Court's established power to make an independent judgment
on questions of law application on appeals from state courts where the basic facts are undis-
puted and a federal right is at stake. See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 174-75 (1975);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51 (1949). See generally Hill, The Inadequate State Ground,
65 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 946-48 (1965); Note, Supreme Court Review of State Findings of Fact
in Fourteenth Amendment Cases, 14 STAN. L. Rxv. 328 (1962).
"' Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88 n.15 (1966).
"' Monaghan, supra note 154, at 530.
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more experienced in making the sort of value judgments required,"'2
and that judges are more inclined to realize the importance of first
amendment values.'63 To this list may be added the desirability of
establishing and following precedents delineating the categories of
protected speech so as to provide a surer guide to publishers and
speakers.
In contrast, juries are authorized to resolve questions of fault,,64
thereby potentially defeating the protection accorded speech, ' and
the inquiry undertaken by appellate courts is confined to determin-
ing whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's finding.
In the defamation area the Court has justified this allocation by
explaining that, because a state of mind element is neutral with
respect to the content of speech, it does not present "a real danger
of becoming an instrument for the suppression of those 'vehement,
caustic and unpleasantly sharp attacks' . . . which must be pro-
tected if the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendment are
to prevail.""
The distinction drawn by the Court between determinations
which depend upon content and those which turn upon the
speaker's state of mind, allocating only the latter to the jury, com-
pels a particular allocation of judgmental authority with respect to
most of the elements of the proposed model. It clearly requires that
the initial determination of newsworthiness 1be made by the trial
"I Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 119 (1960), cited with approval in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 188 n.3 (1964) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
13 Monaghan, supra note 154, at 529.
"I See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 461, 463-64 (1976) (defamation suit
by private figure remanded to the state court to determine negligence vel non of defendant
publisher); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 124 (1974) (jury's finding of scienter
required for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970) for mailing and conspiring to mail
obscene brochures upheld because there was substantial evidence, taking the view most
favorable to the government, to support it); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)
(to sustain a jury's finding of "actual malice" in a defamation suit there must be sufficient
evidence showing "that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of
his publication"). But see Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 292 (1971) (a rational interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous document held as a matter of law not to constitute actual malice).
"I Proof of actual malice defeats the constitutional protection afforded defamatory
speech about public figures. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Similarly, proof of
negligence is sufficient to overcome the constitutional protection afforded defamatory speech
about private individuals. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Scienter is at issue in an obscenity case only if the material is unprotected. See Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 119-24 (1974).
' Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971) (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); see Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153
(1967) (opinion of Harlan, J.).
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judge subject to unfettered appellate review.' 7 Newsworthiness in-
volves assessing the content of speech to determine if it is a permis-
sible predicate for tort liability. Accordingly, the need for the dis-
passionate, experienced judgment and the perceived sensitivity to
first amendment values of the bench is very great. Moreover, pre-
cedents concerning newsworthiness will provide the press with
needed guidance.
Similar reasoning and assumptions support entrusting trial and
appellate judges with responsibility for administering the standard
of care defense-that is, deciding whether privacy-invading speech
is, on its face, injurious to a reasonable sense of individual dignity.
This allocation of responsibility is also mandated by the purpose of
the standard of care defense, ensuring that publishers may be fairly
chargeable with knowledge that they are harming legitimate privacy
interests. Of course, insisting that the judge independently deter-
mine this, or any other, question need not preclude a jury from also
passing on the issue;'8 for example, if the judge determines that a
disclosure is unnewsworthy, he could still permit the jury to find for
the defendants on the ground that the disclosure was newsworthy.
On the other hand, the jury should be charged with primary
responsibility for ascertaining whether the defendant in fact knew
that the disclosure complained of would injure legitimate privacy
interests. The slim role of this element of the proposed model is to
determine if by virtue of special knowledge the defendant in fact
knew that a story superficially innocuous was destructive of a rea-
sonable sense of individual dignity. This element is unrelated to the
content of the disclosure, and consistency with administration of the
fault requirements in obscenity and defamation cases demands that
the jury resolve this question of scienter.
The requirement that the disclosure offend a reasonable sense
of individual dignity is not captured by the dichotomous classifica-
tion of determinations that turn on the content of speech and deter-
minations that relate to the defendant's state of mind. Unconnected
to evaluation of the content of speech or the defendant's state of
mind,the offensive disclosure inquiry asks whether the facts dis-
closed are private facts an individual in the plaintiff's position could
reasonably want to keep private.
Exacerbating the uncertainty caused by the absence of control-
'' The Court has twice independently determined the newsworthiness of private facts.
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967).
IU See Monaghan, supra note 154, at 531-32.
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ling authority, the principles governing the division of judgmental
authority between.judge and jury provide conflicting instruction
with respect to the offensive disclosure requirement. Phrased in
terms of reasonableness, the requirement incorporates community
standards to define the range of facts whose disclosure is proscribed
by the public disclosure tort. On this score, the jury, as the embodi-
ment of community standards, is the preferred arbiter of the offen-
sive disclosure requirement. However, the premises of jury prejudice
and contumacy that undergird the Court's confinement of the jury's
role in cases involving sensitive first amendment interests appear to
mandate committing the task of applying the offensive disclosure
requirement to the trial judge, subject to de novo appellate review.
Granting a jury authority to determine what private facts may be
protected through operation of law as well as responsibility for re-
solving the state of mind question would remit publishers and
speakers to sole reliance on the newsworthiness defense for vindica-
tion of their first amendment rights. Moreover, in passing on the
standard of care question, judges necessarily determine what disclo-
sures of private facts are offensive. The formal point that the stan-
dard of care defense as outlined in this comment involves assessing.
the content of speech while the offensive disclosure inquiry techni-
cally does not is an insufficient ground for distinguishing between
closely related judgments, both of which determine the measure of
constitutional protection afforded true speech.
CONCLUSION
In a public disclosure action the plaintiff seeks to have the
defendant adjudged liable in tort for truthfully disclosing private
facts. Recognizing the ineluctable conflict between unrestricted
operation of the public disclosure tort and freedom of speech and
press, courts have ruled that a privacy action may constitutionally
be maintained only if the facts disclosed are not of legitimate public
interest. This comment has attempted to show that the several
discernible points of conflict between the public disclosure tort and
first amendment freedoms are not resolved by invocation of the
newsworthiness defense, in any of its variant formulations. Under-
taking to reach a principled and administrable accommodation be-
tween the privacy tort and the first amendment, the comment has
argued that a public disclosure action is constitutionally maintaina-
ble only when the disclosure of unnewsworthy private facts seriously
harms the plaintiff's reasonable sense of individual dignity and the
defendant is fairly chargeable with cognizance of the dignitary harm
caused by his disclosure. The proposed model illustrates the concep-
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tually rich and thorough-going tension between contemporary first
amendment principles and the tort inspired by a distinguished law
review article written some eighty-seven years ago.
Jeffrey C. Martin
